persistent unemployment. But whilst this helped explain some features of European experience in the 1980s, it was a long way from the notion of secular stagnation, as the term had been understood by an earlier generation. Thus when the question of stagnation did rear its head, in Europe in the 1980s, or Japan in the 1990s, it did not make sense to see these countries as exhibiting a problem underlying capitalist economies in general. Their experiences were explained in specific, local circumstances. To do otherwise would have been to question the foundations on which macroeconomics had been built.
This move towards individualistic explanations of social phenomena was not confined to economics: it was a much broader cultural phenomenon and had a strong political dimension (Rodgers 2012, Amadae 201*). Rationality, competition and the efficiency of competitive systems came to be seen as defining features of capitalist democracies, marking their superiority over authoritarian, centrally planned socialist states. To entertain the possibility that capitalist economies might exhibit secular stagnation would be to question the superiority of the Western society over Communist regimes. Thus it was only after the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that secular stagnation reappeared. It was used by Walt Rostow analyze possible population trends in the twenty first century, drawing on Japan as a country that had experienced these demographic changes earlier than other advanced countries (Rostow 1998 (Rostow , 2000 . A phenomenon that, at the height of the Cold War, had been no more than a speculative possibility, was now seen as a future that all countries had to confront.
Whilst Japan might face specific problems, which could easily be blamed on some of the many distinctive features of Japanese society, and whilst South East Asia and other parts of the world might have their own problems, there was great confidence in most Western countries as they entered the twenty-first century. The "dot-com" bubble might have burst but the economic outlook was generally seen as benign, described in terms such as "the Great Moderation". Lending and real estate prices might be high and inequality might be rising but this was not taken to indicate structural problems. Stagnation seemed far away. When the crash came there was a sudden spate of interest in Keynes and central banks, supported by their governments, took decisive action. However, though Summers and economists who could be dismissed as being on the left (Stiglitz, Krugman, Pikettty) might question whether structural problems were being overlooked, there was little inclination to question the foundations.
Conclusions xxx

